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T\ o wE FIGHT over the dead to protect the graves of our ancestors? Or doI-f we slaughter the Other for land on which to grow crops? Monica Duft
Toft begins her statistical tests of the correlation of state population distribu-
tion 
- 
urban versus rurall concentrated versus distributed 
- 
with conceptions
of identity by quoting the Uzbeck poet, Cholpan Ergash: 'The Homeland is
the remains of our forefathers who turned into dust for this precious soil.'
Toft's case studies focus on rocky, hilly regions: Tatarstan, Chechnya, Ab-
khazia, and Aiaria. The choice, even the paradigm case of Jerusalem that she
cites (p. r8), suggests the first rather than the second explanation. However,
Peter Balakian's detailed examination of Armenians living in similar terrain
for two thousand years falsifies the explanation: they were not slaughtered
because, immovable, they met the onslaught of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and
later the Young Turks, who also regarded the land as indivisible. The in-
divisible land of Turkey became the pretext for their atrocities against Arme-
nians, most of whom had nothing to do with fomenting panition.
Materially, land is divisible, a useful object to be bought and sold. Spirit-
ually, one's homeland is indivisible, inherent to group identity, a place that
holds the spirits of one's ancestors and for which 
- 
echoing the Palestinian
refugee mantra and the paradigm case 
- 
one is willing to die rather 'than lose
the hope or right of return' (p. z). Toft offers a structural explanation for
ethnic violence, 'the theory of indivisible territory', which purports to explain
why some ethnic conflicts become violent: '\flhen both sides in a conflict
regard control over a disputed territory as indivisible, violence is likely' (p.
z); when they do not, violence is highly unlikely; and when only one side
holds such a view, violent conflict is less likely (p.tzil. The Russian/Tatar
and the Georgian/Aiarian disputes are cases of the second rype; there con-
flicts were resolved without violence. The Russian/Chechen and Georgian/
Abkhazian conflicts are cases of the first type; both have been very violent.
The clarity of the claim is puzzling. In Toft's paradigm case, did the
Zionists not accept partition in 1948 and the Arabs not reject the United
Nations resolution and invade the new state of Israel? Why does violence
continue fifty-five years later, when the majority of both Palestinians and
lsraelis accept a two-state solution? But perhaps Toft is correct after all, for
the Oslo agreement broke down at Taba over two issues: sovereignty over
the Temple Mount, the key sacred symbol for both groups, and, even more
important, over the right of return of the refugees to their original homes.
For Toft, the spiritual indivisibility of territory in contrast to its material
divisibility explains the violent intra-state conflicts in Northern Ireland, Sri
Lanka, Spain, and Yugoslavia, and even some interstate wars 
- 
between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, for example 
- 
in which the politically dominant ethnic
group in each state regards the disputed territory as an essential pan of its
homeland.
But how many in the state must subscribe to the belief in indivisibility?
What if the military, the intelligence service, and the politicians disagree?
What are the roles of different 6lites? Do different 6lites lead differently, or
do they respond to different aspects of the popular will? Is the popular will
divisible? For Toft, the views of the rural population, not of cosmopolitans
living in cities, are what matter. Thus, though the territory may be taken as
indivisible, what also matters is the divisibility of society. In fact, ethnic con-
flict occurs only when sociery is divisible 
- 
between the cities and the
countryside; when two ethnic groups occupy the same rural territory; and,
whatever the distribution of the groups throughout the territory, when one
ethnic group is concentrated in part of the territory; only then do we find the
proneness to violent outcomes,
Does population concentration in rural areas and capability explain
holding an indivisibiliry ideology? If so, then ideology is but a by-product of
material circumstances, particularly when one notes that Georgians were
more highly concentrated in Abkhazia (almost half the population at 460/o)
than in Ajaria (only 39%). For Toft, however, the key variable is the fact that
Ajars identified themselves as Georgian (Muslim rather than Christian), and
did not think of themselves as a separate ethnic group as the Abkhazians did.
By contrast, 'violence did not erupr in Czechoslovakia because the stronger
actor 
- 
the Czech Republic 
- 
had nothing to lose (in terms of identity) and
much to gain (economically) from Slovak secession. Violence did erupt in
Yugoslavia because Serbia, the stronger actor, had nothing to gain and
everything to lose, both economically and concerning its identity, by al-
lowing the secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia' (p. lll). However,
Serb control of the military was a contributing cause of the violence. Thus,
even if questions of identity and the distribution of minorities in rural areas,
particularly over a long time, do matter, the institutional (Serb control of the
army) and the economic conditions of those living in resource-poor regions
matter, too.
Toft admits that her explanation requires the overlaying of legitimacy and
identity with power (p. rl+) and economic scarciry, but does not explain
why legitimacy and identity are not overlaid on power and scarcity, or why
the four are not given equal weight. Powerful neighbouring stares may tip
the balance; without Russian support, for example, the Abkhazians were un-
likely to have resorted to violence (p. rfZ).One hears these doubts expressed
by l-eslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma in their essay for Robert Gellately
and Ben Kieman: 'the inadequacy of our theoretical frameworks to explain
the chillingly careful brutality that characterized the violence' (pp. 3ol-z). In
Toft, one longs for the richness of detail in a straightforward historical
account.
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The subtitle of Gellately and Kiernan's collection, 'Mass Murder in Histor-
ical Perspective', promises an historical approach to genocide and mass
murder. However, the main title,'The Specur of Genocide', is puzzling. Do
Gellately and Kiernan regard intentional non-functional mass murder as a
terrifring ghostly presence in everyday life, or as an unreal and exceptional
imagined apparition that is a source of dread? Perhaps genocide is carried
out by figures resembling Pesh-Chidin in Ron Howard's recent movie, The
Missing, a figure of extravagantly repulsive, fantastical ugliness and pock-
marked evil. Or perhaps in a more banal and less magical realm, genocide is
a whimsical residue of the ghosts of Edgar Allen Poe, the haunting presence
of death and the abnormal in everyday life; the expression of a latent Freud-
ian death wish for a world in which everything and everyone is dead, as John
Updike suggested in 196o in a short story, 'Pigeon Feathers', in which a
farm boy sets out to exterminate the pigeons in the barn. Do Gellately and
Kiernan regard genocide as the reduction of spirit into the pursuit of self-
sacrifice and death for a corporeal presence that echoes Toft's idolization of
the indivisible land as an icon of death?
None of the eighteen essays in the collection even hints at the presence of
such a spectre, though several suggest that most rational explanations are in-
adequate. Edward Kissi's essay on Ethiopia and Cambodia implies that the
group named as the enemy to be purged as the Other to cleanse the body
politic is selected arbitrarily, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, nationality,
and even politics. Similarly, Marie Fleming notes: 'Given the contingent and
historical nature of genocides, it is vinually impossible to predict them' (p.
II3). However, most essays offer versions of rational choice explanations
without any sensitivity to a haunting ghostly presence or serendipity.
Four of the essays discuss two of the contrary theses discussed in Toft:
genocide as a product of modernity and genocide as a recidivist act resulting
from inadequate modernization. These are complemented by three essays on
the relationship of colonialism with indigenous populations, and case
studies, four earlier (Armenia, Stalin's crimes, the Nazi genocide of the Jews,
the Japanese atrocities) and six post-Second t0florld $flar: the slaughters in
Bali in 1965, the genocides by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia under Pol
Pot, the slaughters by the Dergue regime under Mengistu Haile Mariam in
Ethiopia between 1976 and 1979, the genocide of the Mayan under General
Efrain Rios Montt between r98r and 1983 in Guatemala as determined by
the Historical Clarification Commission, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994
(which the editors considered to be a tuming point, without explaining why,
p. 7), and the ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia beween r99r and 1999.
Toft treats genocide as an extreme form of ethnic violence (p. 3). Most of
Gellately and Kieman's contributors, and Balakian, rreat it as radically dif-
ferent because of its intent and extent (total extermination), asymmetry, and
the fact that mass popular suppoft is not a precondition, though Robert
Melson suggests, erroneously, that Rwanda was the exception, for he argues
(as discussed later in this essay) that the genocide in Rwanda was supported
by the majority of the population. For Omer Bartov (pp. ZS-g6), who em-
phasizes continuity, genocide is a product of civilization and the assertion of
identity even in the ancient world. Others stress its modernity.
Like Balakian, who is concemed with the United States, only a few of the
essays suggest that the role of the bysrander is crucial: Gavan McCormack
cites US complicity with the Khmer Rouge and John G. Taylor adds Aus-
tralia. The collection focuses almost exclusively on the perpetrators, their
motives (fear and hatred), intentions (extermination, economic gain, expan-
sion of territory), and methods (especially their attempts to conceal their
activities, and the extent to which they manipulate the masses or play on
irrational fears and prejudices already present to elicit the consent and even
involvement of the majority).
Bartov's bottom-up approach is rich in detail. He depicts the metamor-
phosis of a co-operative community, the Polish town of Buczacz, in which
Jews historically constituted the largest group, into one in which the pattem
of mass extermination (and exceptional rescue) grew from deeper local,
social-cultural roots starting before the Nazi occupation. According to Bar-
tov, 'non-bureaucratic' and 'non-technological' personal acts of murder
were common both under Polish rule and the temporary Soviet rule that
followed the partition of September 1939. This contrasts implicitly with
Hannah Arendt's thesis about the bureaucratic, and, hence, banal, and high-
tech nature of the Nazi genocide generally said to be characteristic of the
Holocaust.
Why is modernity, then, the 'scourge' and 'the Moloch to be feared'?
Fleming echoes Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno's conception of
'the instrumental rationality of the Enlightenment' with its capitalist system
and bureaucratic organization. Add, in the nyentieth century, the concept of
total war, in which civilians are both the main victims and also, with indus-
trialization, the key to support for the war effort. The masses are enlisted
through mimetic repetition of rituals, uniforms, drum beats, words, and ges-
tures. Abetted by historical prejudice, opportunism, and the quest for
nationalist identity, technological innovation in communications, sun'eil-
lance, and transportation, combined with modem state bureaucracy, geno-
cide is made possible over a vast territory (Eric D. \0fleitz, pp. 53-4).
But there is more to it. Modern mass murder requires that the victim be
dehumanized, made anonymous, and the act concealed in imitation of the
disappearance of the public spectacle of punishment behind the prison wall
that Michel Foucault documented and whose theories Fleming dissects. By
contrast, historical mass extenninations, sometimes echoed in modem mass
deponations and slaughters, were applauded and publicized to instil fear in
others and facilitate domination; when individual victims were sacrificed,
their quality boosted the reputations of the killen. One is reminded of the
boasts of the Butcher in the frlm The Gangs of New YorA, whose traditional
mode of slaughter contrasts with modern anonymous modes adumbrated by
the American Civil rWar, the background to the film, and the slaughter
through which the modern organized bureaucracy represses the riots in New
York that end the film.
Fleming, who inuoduces a dissenting footnote to the modemist thesis in a
reference to Jean-Frangois Lyotard, suggests that accusations levelled against
Jews for engaging in forbidden magic and bloody ritual were deep-seated
projections of a desire to regress to archaic practices of sacrifice (p. IoI),
proiections that provide the societal and cultural bases for popular suppoft.
Pre-modern human sacrifice or mass murder was considered to be a moral
act furthering a spiritual mission, unlike the modern service to further a
utopian cause. The latter was accomplished either through expressing a
spirit already embedded in the Volh, or by a material purification of the
people from that which interfered with their fullest self-realization.
Hence, the stress in many of the essays on the four horses of the modern
apocalypse 
- 
race, tape, raum, and revolution 
- 
though Kieman (p. z9) re-
places rape with religion and revolution with Toft's emphasis on the soil and
attachment to an indivisible homeland, treated as a feature of the modernist
revolutionary ideology conceming land in an increasingly mobile and transi-
tional world. rVeitz and Melson see only three constants: warfare, race, and
revolution. The 1999 Repon of the Historical Clarification Commission on
Guatemala on the atrocities committed against the Mayan people by the
state apparatus during the civil war, ongoing since 1954 (Memory of Silence,
February t999), the results of which Greg Grandin summarizes, includes
only exclusive racism, and adds economics and political authoritarianism. In
contrast, Jacques Semelin, in looking at Yugoslavia, stresses 'mass rape and
the profanation of graves' (p. 369), and challenges rational functionalist at-
tempts at explanation.
ril?hatever the number and the categories selected, they are apocalyptic
horsemen because, unlike Plato's two horses of the passions and the spirit of
courage, which are harnessed together because courage can listen to reason
while the passions cannot, these four horses are inherently contradictory and
pull in four different directions.
In the biological division of humanity into a hierarchy of people, blood is
transformed from the essence of life into an abstraction that defines an ideal
homogeneous body politic in a land that is one and indivisible, despite
humans living in a world that is, and needs to be, biologically heterogeneous.
The paradox is that rape is used as a tool of purification. On the one hand,
rape denies the ideal and helps to ensure heterogeneitg on the orher hand, it
does so only by debasing the sexual act to carnality. This biological
reduction to propagation and mortality, in what Foucault termed a'society
of sex', displaces the discourse of a 'society of blood' in a culture that em-
phasizes prudery and wholesomeness of the family; and is, at its base, homo-
sexual rather than heterosexual.
Rautn, which derives from colonialist claims to cultural and racial super-
iority that legitimize violence, is exemplified in the treatment of aboriginal
peoples by European colonizers. Isabel V. Hull ties colonialism to genocide
in South-r0fest Africa: German military practices favouring final solutions led
to the slaughterof between 75 and 8o per cent of the Herero and 45 to 5o
per cent of the Nama. If Hull situates colonialism and extermination in the
habits and assumptions embedded in a military culture shielded from civil-
ian oversight, and free to use unlimited force to solve problems, Elazar
Barkan echoes Mark Cocker's argumentl that native peoples partly self-
destructed on account of their fissiparous and tribalized societies, ritualized
warfare, and inefficient weapons (p. 8+).
John G. Taylor challenges the hypothesis of shared responsibility in an
account of Indonesia's use in 1975 of unrestrained force in the conquest of
East Timor, that destroyed one-third of the population. The event is attrib-
utable not only to the absence of domestic civilian oversight of the military
but also to international indifference, and even complicity. Intervention took
place in 1999 owing to the combination of a radical change in the domestic
politics of Indonesia 
- 
the overthrow of Suharto in 1998 
- 
with an economic
crisis that required intemational aid and the shift to military interventionism
by the United States and Australia after rr September zoor.
If raum stresses unbounded terrain for future expansion, revolution's
ideological utopianism harks back to a purified ancestral homeland in a fan-
tasized rural past. At the same time, it mobilizes the masses to serve the
industrial state's policies on education, economic development, and exter-
I M. Cocker, Ritters of Blood, Riaers o! Gold: Europe's Conqueu of Indigenous Peoples (I-ondon, 1998).
mination that destroy the substance of the inherited culture, and leave only
its shell as an object of worship; rituals of violence and murder become the
essence of its being in its obsession with pests, pollution, purgation, and
purity.
Balakian in his book, and Jay $(/inter in his essay, apply the analogy of the
Holocaust to the Armenian genocide, ideologically, intellectually, and in-
strumentally. \tr(/inter argues that, only by understanding the evenrs of r9r5,
can we understand the new kind of total war against a civilian population
fought under the cover of an interstate war. Balakian, who shares the view
(cf. p. r8o), also demonstrates that the events of r9r5, especially the work of
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), continued a trend traced
back through the pre-war slaughters in r9o9, the extermination plans made
by Abdul Hamid II, to the mass murders of the r89os 'morivared by Islamic
fanaticism and a jihad mentality' (p. rrz), organized by Muslim clerics,
imams, and, so;ftas. They were abetted by the US envoy, Alexander rVatson
Terrell, who rationalized the mass murder as the sultan's attempt to 'cleanse
his empire from filth and disease' owing to his concem 'for the health of his
people' (p. lzo). Such attitudes neuralized men such as James Bryce,
Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford University, who had issued
wamings in both a speech at Harvard in l88l and in an article published in
Century Magazine in 1895, when he was under-secretary for foreign affairs in
the earl of Rosebery's administration. Balakian demonstrates that total war is
only a condition for allowing genocide to become total and not for genocide
to occur.
As Nicolas V/erth shows of the cenrally organized famine in the Ukraine,
northern Caucasus, and Kazakhstan of 1932-3, and the Great Terror of
1937-8, and as Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma show of the slaughter
in 1965 of a million people in Indonesia in the proiect of 'cleaning Com-
munism from the national body politic' (p. zg5), organized, systematic mass
murder does not require the cover of total war, only an exercise in social
engineering by a ruthless despot indifferent to the ethnic composition of
those being killed. Gellately portrays the Nazi persecution between 1933 and
r939 as equally arbitrary: interstate war simply enables a despot to avoid
both domestic and foreign scrutiny.
The test for the validity of this idea should be Melson's study of Rwanda.
He is the foremost proponent of the theory that, in addition to a racist ideol-
ogy, genocide is the product ofwar, which both provides cover and so fore-
stalls internal criticism and, ostensibly, forecloses the alternative of expulsion
(not foreclosed in Rwanda), and of revolution, which legitimates the events.
Even though Melson sometimes limits the applicability of the theory to
'some important cases' (p. llS), usually'revolution and war... proved
decisive for enabling ideological motivations to be translated into policies of
genocide' (p. :26).
The essay, though, is marred by mistakes. For example, Melson states:
'One of the long-run effects of the Rwandan revolution was to set off a
vicious spiral of ever-increasing violence berween Tutsi guerrilla forces oper-
ating abroad and the Rwandan state, as well as a government-sponsored
campaign against domestic Rwandan Tutsis that culminated in the genocide
of r994' b. ff z). But the so-called 'vicious spiral' did not occur: the vio-
lence from Tutsi based abroad had been defeated by 1966, within four years
of the consolidation of the revolution and Rwanda's independence. Further,
the persecution of 
- 
not discrimination against 
- 
the domestic Tutsi popula-
tion stopped with Major-General Juvdnal Habyarimana's coup in r973, as
Melson acknowledges. The violence against the domestic Tutsi staned again
in t99o after the invasion of Rwanda in October by the Tutsi-led Rwanda
Patriotic Front (not, as Melson depicts it, the commencement of operations
'that would ultimately lead to the invasion of the country' (p. l:l).
Correcting such mistakes should strengthen rather than weaken Melson's
theory that the cover ofwar is a necessary condition for genocide, though at
the cost of the theory on the relationship with revolution. There was no
necessary connection between the revolutionary ideology of Hutu majority
rule, underpinned by a doctrine of race inherited from the Belgians, and the
genocide of the Tutsi. The revitalizing of society by a new system of legit-
imation occurred neither in r99o nor in 1994, nor by mass panicipation.
Melson claims that the pafticipation of the 'majority of the population' as
willing executioners was unique to the Rwanda genocide (p. :fZ). Further,
Melson claims that the majority of Hutus joined in the slaughter (p. 333);
the more reliable figure is ro per cent. 'Tens of thousands' (p. l:+) do not
make a majority of three or four million. Nor does citing Liisa Malkki help:
her study compared how an anti-Tutsi paranoid racialist ideology was re-
inforced in a Burundian refugee camp environment with the way it dis-
sipated in an urban environment.l
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The three books throw suspicion on any formulaic explanation of the causes
of mass murder and genocide. They suggest that some combination of the
following is present: depictions of the Other designed to exclude, and efforts,
such as rape, to destroy its reproductive capacity; attempts to rei$r one's
own homeland; authoritarian leadership fostered by economic downturn; a
revolutionary ideology; and the cover of war. They are better illustrated by
deep historical study than by a simplified theory derived from and applied to
a small number of fixed elements.
1 L. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmologt among Hutu Refugees in
Tanzania (Chicago, r995).
